

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UNSC, XF

SUBJ: CONSULTATIONS WITH BRITISH ON SECURITY COUNCIL

MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST

1. UK EMBYCOUNS MOBERLY CALLED ON ASST SECY SISCO MAY 11;
DEP ASST SECY ATHERTON AND IO/ UNP DIRECTOR STULL ALSO
ATTENDED. MOBERLY SAID LONDON REMAINED EAGER TO STAY IN
TOUCH WITH WASHINGTON ON FORTHCOMING SC DEBATE. HMG WISHED
IF POSSIBLE AVOID NEGATIVE IMPACT AS RESULT OF SC MEETING
AND DESIRED PUT BEST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVING CONSTRUCTIVE OUT-
COME. HMG WISHED ESCHEW STERILE POLEMICS PREDICTED BY
ISRAELI UN PERMREP TEKOAH. IN BRITISH VIEW SADAT INCREAS-
INGLY TENDING TO PAINT HIMSELF INTO CORNER AND THERE WAS
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NEED FOR EFFORT TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING. BRITISH IN LONDON HAD BEEN CONSIDERING VARIOUS IDEAS, NONE OF WHICH WERE NEW OR EARTHSHAKING. EMPHASIS OF BRITISH THOUGHT HAD BEEN UPON PROCEDURAL RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS AS LATTER TENDED TO LEAD TO POSSIBILITY COUNCIL BEING BOGGED DOWN. IN UK VIEW WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS PROCEDURAL DEVICE WHICH MIGHT ENABLE SADAT ENTER INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IN

OTHER CHANNELS. DEVICES UNDER CONSIDERATION WERE: (A) REACTIVATION OF JARRING MISSION; (B) A NEW JARRING INITIATIVE COMBINED WITH AN INITIATIVE BY SYG; (C) SECURITY COUNCIL CONSTITUTING ITSELF AS COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

COUNCIL ON ME, OR (D) SECURITY COUNCIL SUBCOMMITTEE CONSISTING OF SOME MEMBERS OF SC.

2. MOBERLY SAID PROBLEM PRESENTED BY LAST IDEA WAS THAT SUBCOMMITTEE CONSISTING PURELY OF PERMREPS WAS BASICALLY RESTARTING FOUR- POWER TALKS WITH ADDED COMPLICATION OF CHINESE. SUBCOMMITTEE COMPOSED OF NONPERM MEMBERS OF SC WOULD HAVE INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORY OF ME DISPUTE TO DATE TO BE EFFECTIVE. SUBCOMMITTEE COMPOSED OF ENTIRE SC WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY BE FORUM FOR POLEMICS TEKOA FORESAW. PROBLEM FURTHER COMPLICATED BY ABSENCE PRC ACCEPTANCE OF SC RES 242. ON OTHER HAND, SUBCOMMITTEE MIGHT PROVIDE ADEQUATE BUFFER TO SC ON ME AFFAIRS AND/ OR FOR RENEWED EFFORTS AMB JARRING. POSSIBILITY ALSO EXISTED FOR REPLACEMENT OF JARRING. IN THIS CONTEXT QUESTION AROSE AS TO ACCEPTABILITY BY ALL SIDES OF ANY REPLACEMENT. DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS OF PARTIES TO DISPUTE ON NATURE SECURITY COUNCIL RES 242, WHICH ISRAELIS VIEWED AS AGENDA FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND ARABS VIEWED AS SOLUTION TO ME DISPUTE REQUIRING IMPLEMENTATION, WAS FURTHER COMPLICATING FACTOR. MOBERLY NOTED THAT JUNE 1970 US NEGOTIATING FORMULA ACCEPTED BY PARTIES AT TIME OF CEASEFIRE WAS IDEA WHICH APPEALED TO TONY PARSONS. WHILE NEGOTIATIONS NEVER GOT OFF THE GROUND DUE TO CEASEFIRE- STANDSTILL VIOLATIONS, 1970 FORMULA, WHICH ACCEPTED BY PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE, POSSIBLY COULD BE REVIVED IN MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAELIS WHICH IN TURN MIGHT ALLOW ARABS TO MOVE TOWARD INDIRECT
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NEGOTIATIONS.

3. SISCO ASKED MOBERLY IN LIGHT OF HMG KNOWLEDGE OF EGYPTIAN VIEWS AND CONSULTATIONS WITH GOE, WHAT BRITISH UNDERSTANDING WAS OF EGYPTIAN DESIRES AS RESULT OF SC DEBATE. MOBERLY WAS NOT VERY FORTHCOMING IN REPLY, SAYING ONLY THAT BRITISH UNDERSTANDING WAS GOE WAS NOT RPT NOT MERELY

SEEKING PROPAGANDA EXERCISE TO ISOLATE ISRAEL AND PERHAPS ALSO USG. HE ADDED HMG AND FRANCE HAVE URGED ON GOE NEED FOR SC DEBATE ON ME TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE IN INTENT AND RESULT. BRITISH HAD ENDEAVORED TO DRAW OUT GOE ON EGYPTIAN DESIRES AS RESULT OF DEBATE BUT GOE TO DATE HAD AVOIDED SPECIFICS. GOE HAD NOT RPT NOT RULED OUT ESTABLISHMENT OF UN MECHANISMS TO PROVIDE VENUE FOR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. SISCO COMMENTED HE UNDERSTOOD HMG DESIRE TO EASE SADAT'S CURRENT UNTENABLE POSITION. HE ASKED WHAT EGYPTIAN MOTIVATION IN GOING TO SC AT THIS TIME WAS. MOBERLY REPLIED HMG HAD IMPRESSION THAT GOE WANTED SOMETHING TO SHOW THAT PROCESS OF DRIFT WAS NOT RPT NOT DOMINANT ELEMENT IN ME EQUATION AT THIS TIME, BUT RATHER THAT POSITIVE STEPS WERE UNDER WAY TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES 242. UNCERTAINTY REMAINED WHETHER GOE PREPARED

ACCEPT FORMULA ALLOWING INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS TO GET UNDER WAY. GOE SABER RATTLING APPEARED TO BE ATMOSPHERIC PREPARATION FOR UPCOMING SUPERPOWER SUMMIT. EGYPTIAN HOPES REMAINED MIRED IN DESIRE THAT THE SUPER POWERS PULL EGYPTIAN CHESTNUTS OUT OF FIRE. HMG ASSESSMENT WAS THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT RPT NOT RESORT TO MILITARY OPTION UNTIL IT SAW OUTCOME OF SC DEBATE.

4. SISCO ASKED MOBERLY WHAT IN HMG VIEW FRENCH VIEWS ON SC ME DEBATE WERE. MOBERLY REPLIED THAT GOF APPARENTLY UNDECIDED RE WHAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM DEBATE. AT PRESENT GOF APPEARED TO BE THINKING OF RENEWED EFFORT BY AMB JARRING COMBINED WITH SC COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL. THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT FINAL FRENCH POSITION BUT RATHER REFLECTED TENDENCY OF GOF THOUGHTS.

5. ASST SECY SISCO NOTED THAT USG WAS PLEASED TO CONSULT WITH HMG. RECALLING RECENT SC PROCEEDINGS, HE SAID IT
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REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER REASONABLE MEETING OF MINDS COULD RESULT FROM SC ME DEBATE. US ASSESSMENT WAS SLIGHTLY LESS SANGUINE THAN THAT OF HMG THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MIGHT FIND COMMON GROUND. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT DIFFERENCE IN BASIC OBJECTIVES OF TWO COUNTRIES BUT RATHER RESULT PERHAPS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RESPECTIVE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAY BE PARAMOUNT IN MINDS OF EACH. BASICALLY USG REGRETTED GOE RESORT TO SC AT THIS TIME. THIS WAS LARGELY BECAUSE PAST RECORD OF SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE JUNE WAR HAD CONTRIBUTED LARGELY TO CONTINUING UNREAL PERCEPTION THAT SOMEONE ELSE COULD DO THE JOB FOR PARTIES TO ME DISPUTE. WHETHER FOUR OR FIVE POWER TALKS, SUMMIT MEETINGS, PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OR SC COMMITTEES, SUCH IDEAS UNDERLINE PRIMARY RELIANCE OF

GOE ON OUTSIDE FORCES TO ACHIEVE CAIRO' S DESIRES. FIRST
USG CONSIDERATION IN UPCOMING SC
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